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Case Note

Sovereignty on Our Terms
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2000).

In an era of economic globalization, U.S. judges must increasingly
consider the international consequences of their decisions, even when those
decisions are purely procedural or managerial. A salient example of the
need for such consideration is the dispute over the procedures for
conducting discovery of evidence located abroad:' U.S. judges have been
eager to employ the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when ordering
discovery, while foreign nations and defendants have insisted that the
United States comply with its treaty obligations and employ the Hague
Evidence Convention.2 In a recent decision, In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litigation,the District Court for the District of Columbia intervened in this
debate by ordering that the Federal Rules be used not only for discovery on
the merits, but also for discovery necessary to resolve a dispute over the
court's jurisdiction.3 The court extended a questionable line of precedents
that displaced the Hague Convention in the management of discovery in
federal courts.
Part I of this Case Note reviews the background and substance of the
D.C. court's ruling. Part II criticizes the decision for its inattentiveness to
fundamental due process principles, sovereignty considerations, and U.S.
treaty commitments. Part III analyzes the potential repercussions of the
decision and offers an approach aimed at averting these repercussions.

1. "No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of
the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation
and litigation in the United States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 442, Reporters' Notes 1, at 354 (1990) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signatureMar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
3. 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D.D.C. 2000) (relying on the special master's report for its
holding).
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I
Upon the urging of practitioners dissatisfied with the burdensome and
unreliable process for obtaining discovery of evidence located abroad, a
group of states participating in the Hague Conference on Private
International Law negotiated the Hague Evidence Convention as a means to
facilitate the process of extraterritorial discovery. In place of a patchwork of
4
inconsistent and complicated procedures that varied from state to state, the
Hague Convention set minimum standards that harmonized the procedures
5
for extraterritorial discovery used in civil-law and common-law countries
6
The Hague Convention was initiated by the U.S. delegation and was duly
signed and ratified by the United States.7
In response to inconsistent treatment of the Convention by lower courts,
the Supreme Court addressed the Convention's applicability to U.S. cases
in Socitj Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v. United States District
Court.' The Court held the Convention to be "optional" and established a

balancing test for trial courts to follow in determining whether to use the
Hague Convention or the Federal Rules for obtaining evidence from
abroad.9 Lower courts were directed to evaluate the facts of the case (such
as the burden that discovery imposed on the defendant), the sovereign
interests involved, and the effectiveness of the Convention in facilitating
the desired discovery.' ° Airospatiale has been criticized by scholars at
length for its inherent bias against foreign parties," and practice has
confirmed their suspicion that the Agrospatiale test disfavors the Hague

4. Problems with the old discovery practices included the expense of translations, delays in
procuring the evidence, and the inappropriate form in which the evidence was ultimately
produced. James Chalmers, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery Inter Partes: Trial
Court Decisions Post-Arrospatiale, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 189, 190-91 (2000).
5. For example, it made letters of request the principal means of obtaining evidence abroad,
increased the powers of consuls, and established a mechanism for securing evidence in the form
needed by the court where the action is pending. Socidtd Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1987).
6. The U.S. decision to propose the drafting of an evidence convention reflected a
"longstanding interest of American lawyers in improving procedures for obtaining evidence
abroad." Id. at 530 (citing S. ExEc. REP. No. 92-25, at 3 (1972) (statement of Carl F. Salans,
Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State)).
7. The Convention is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (1994).
8. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
9. Id. at 544-46.
10. Id. The last prong of the test manifests the Court's underlying mistrust of the Hague
Convention's effectiveness. The mistrust is echoed in many post-Agrospatialedecisions, yet it is
not supported by empirical evidence. E.g., Chalmers, supranote 4, at 200-01.
11. E.g., George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme Court: A
Critique of the Adrospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525 (1989); Patricia Anne Kuhn,
Comment, Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale The Supreme Court's MisguidedApproach
to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Roger C. Wilson, Recent
Development, The Hague Evidence Convention in U.S. Courts: Adrospatiale and the Path Not
Taken, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 591 (1987).
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Convention. Lower courts relying on the test have almost universally found
that the Federal Rules were the proper vehicle for obtaining discovery
abroad. 12
In Vitamins, the District Court for the District of Columbia not only
joined other courts in conducting the balancing test in favor of the Federal
Rules, but also extended Airospatialeto cases of jurisdictional discovery. 3

The Vitamins defendants, most of whom were multinational companies
based in Europe, were accused of violating antitrust laws by conspiring to
fix the price of vitamins sold on the U.S. market. They contested the court's

personal jurisdiction over them, 4 so the court ordered discovery to resolve
the issue. The court found that the choice of procedures for conducting
jurisdictional discovery abroad was a question of first impression in the
District of Columbia. The Agrospatiale decision was not found to be
controlling because it involved discovery on the merits, 5 whereas the

Vitamins case concerned pre-jurisdiction discovery, relating only to the
defendants' contacts with the forum. 16 In the absence of evidence of such
contacts, the defendants' claim not to be subjected to a foreign forum's
rules was much weightier and the case for the application of the Hague
Convention much stronger. This argument, however, was ultimately
rejected by the Vitamins court.

The court opined that the sovereign interests of foreign nations were not
greater in the pre-jurisdiction than in the post-jurisdiction stage and that the
court inherently possessed jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. It
decided that first resort to the Hague Convention would be inappropriate
and fell back on the Airospatiale balancing test, despite the earlier
acknowledgment that the two cases were different in critical respects. After

12. Chalmers, supra note 4.
13. The Vitamins decision was not the first to extend the Airospatiale balancing test to
jurisdictional discovery, but it was the first to offer an extended justification for this holding. See
Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525, 529 (S.D. Iowa 1997); In re Bedford Computer Corp.,
114 B.R. 2, 5-6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); Rich v. Kis Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 260 (M.D.N.C.
1988). But see Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., No. 86-4229, 1988 WL 54733 (E.D. La. 1988)
(ordering first resort to the Hague Convention); Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297, 301
n. 11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (same).
14. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' guilty plea in a criminal investigation of the
vitamins conspiracy in Texas sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction under the national contacts
test of Rule 4(k)(2), while the defendants countered that: (1) the use of the guilty plea violated due
process because the defendants had not consented to jurisdiction in the civil case; and (2)
precedent required that, under the national contacts test, a link be established with the forum
where the action was initially filed-in this case, Illinois. The court found the defendants'
assertions "highly suspect," but felt bound by precedent and ordered jurisdictional discovery to
resolve the matter. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 26, 28 (D.D.C. 2000).
15. As the Vitamins court acknowledges, the Supreme Court repeatedly asserted that the
Adrospatiale test applies to cases where personal jurisdiction has already been established.
Vitamins, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 48-49.
16. Id. at 47.
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examining the litigants' interests, sovereignty concerns, 7 and the efficiency
of the Hague Convention, the court ruled that the Federal Rules should be
used to obtain extraterritorial discovery pertaining to jurisdiction.
II
The extension of Aerospatiale to jurisdictional discovery is plagued by
a logical inconsistency underlying all orders for discovery at the prejurisdiction stage. In the absence of an established link between the
defendant and the forum, the court has no authorization to exercise its
power over that defendant. As the Supreme Court has declared more than
once, "[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause." " The power to order jurisdictional discovery is a
concession to pragmatism. If the court did not possess such power, a
defendant could thwart the process by challenging jurisdiction and then
withholding the evidence needed to resolve the jurisdictional question. 9
These pragmatic justifications do not, however, overcome the fact that
the court's legitimacy in issuing discovery orders is tenuous. If
"jurisdiction is power," then pre-jurisdiction lies at the threshold between
power and powerlessness. Fundamental considerations of fairness and due
process demand that the court proceed with caution in imposing its rules
upon a defendant who might not have reasonably foreseen being brought
before it.2 Fairness considerations become even more central when the
defendant is a foreign party who owes no allegiance to the forum and is
unfamiliar with the mandates of the forum's legal system. As the Supreme
Court noted in Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court, " [t]he unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system
should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching
the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders." 2
Extraterritorial discovery also affects the sovereign interests of the
defendants' home states. Private parties conducting discovery abroad, with
17. Unfortunately, the court recognized as a sovereign interest of the states involved only that
of protecting their citizens from abusive discovery, which was deemed incidental compared to the
U.S. interest in enforcing its laws. For a discussion of why this conception of sovereignty interests
is incomplete, see infra text accompanying notes 22-27.
18. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).
19. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978); Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir.), aff'd sub nora. Ins.
Corp. of It. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinde, 456 U.S. 694 (1981).
20. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21. 480 U.S. at 114.
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the permission of the U.S. court, assume a function that in civil-law

countries is reserved to the judiciary. These countries believe that U.S.
court orders authorizing discovery in their territory interfere with their
judicial sovereignty. 2
American jurisprudence recognizes that undue expansion of a court's
personal jurisdiction raises sovereignty concerns. As the Supreme Court
declared in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the minimum

contacts test not only protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant forum, but also "acts to ensure that the States through their
courts, do not reach beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 2 3 In Asahi, the Court found that
concerns about interfering with a foreign forum's sovereignty are more
pressing in the international context and declared that sovereign interests
would be "best served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the
assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case." 24 The Court emphasized that
"[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions
of personal jurisdiction into the international field." 25
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law also calls for

reasonableness in the exercise of jurisdiction, as mandated by both U.S. and
international law. After listing traditional grounds for jurisdiction, such as
territoriality and nationality, the Restatement clarifies that "an exercise of
jurisdiction on one of the bases.., is nonetheless unlawful if it is
unreasonable[. This principle] is established in United States law, and has
emerged as a principle of international law as well." 2 Reasonableness
hinges on factors such as the firmness of the link between the defendant and
the forum, the importance of the regulations to the regulating state, the
22. E.g., Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 55758 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). Despite the Court's admonitions, the sovereignty aspect of the
minimum contacts test has sometimes been overlooked. See, e.g., Rich v. Kis Cal., Inc.,
121 F.R.D. 254, 259 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (noting that, because the standard for determining personal
jurisdiction is grounded in the Due Process Clause and not in Article III, courts need only look to
the individual liberty interests of the defendants and not to sovereignty interests).
24. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
25. Id. (citing United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 403 cmt. a. For further discussion of how extraterritorial
discovery may conflict with public international law norms, most importantly, with the principle
of noninterference with the sovereignty of other states, see David J. Gerbert, International
Discovery After Arospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 521,
534-35 (1988). Cf. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 21, U.N. Doc. A18028 (1970), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 1292 (1970) ("(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; (d) The
territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable .. "); MALCOLM N,
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 454 (1997) ("It follows from the nature of the sovereignty of states
that while a state is supreme internally, that is within its own territorial frontiers, it must not
intervene in the domestic affairs of another nation.").
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potential for conflict with regulations by another state, and, importantly, the
extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system. 27 This last consideration-consistency with the
traditions of the international system-is notably absent from the Vitamins
opinion, and the sovereignty interests of the home states are reduced to the
interest in protecting their citizens from abusive discovery.
The failure to give effect to the Hague Convention in federal courts also
violates treaty obligations undertaken by the United States in signing and
ratifying the agreement.28 It is arguable that Agrospatiale itself was such a
violation: The holding that the Convention did not provide a mandatory
framework for conducting extraterritorial discovery was not shared by all
parties to the treaty. 29 Agrospatiale, however, preserved a role for the
Convention in cases of jurisdictional discovery and discovery directed to
nonparties. The Vitamins court's extension of that holding, on the other
hand, deprives the Convention of any practical significance in U.S. courts
and effectively nullifies the executive's decision to sign and Congress's
choice to ratify the Convention. Furthermore, it is inconsistent with the
primacy accorded to treaties under both U.S. and international law.
III
In resolving questions of jurisdictional discovery, balancing the values
of international treaties against the Federal Rules is neither a prudent nor a
legitimate course for courts to take. The Hague Convention adequately
protects the plaintiffs' and United States' interests in obtaining discovery.
Unlike a decision on jurisdiction, the application of the Hague Convention
is not outcome-determinative, but rather concerns the choice of a method
for arriving at the jurisdictional question. The plaintiff is not denied her day
in court-only ordered to employ internationally accepted procedures to
gather evidence on her jurisdictional claims.
On the other hand, the reluctance to employ the Hague Convention
produces significant negative consequences both for U.S. foreign relations
and for the international system as a whole. To outsiders, the interest
"balancing" conducted by the Vitamins court appears more like "the
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 403. The consideration of systemic interests is critical in
jurisdictional decisions: "Jurisdictional rules ... describe community expectations about the reach
of sovereign power. Therefore, [they] especially must reflect community interests. If they do not,
jurisdictional principles become instruments of anarchy, not of order, and lose their utility as
organizing principles for transnational conduct." Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 584 (1983).
28. See, e.g., Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae, Socidtd Nationale
Industrielle Afirospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 85-1695); Kuhn, supra
note 11, at 1037-42.
29. Kuhn, supra note 11, at 1037-42.
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assertion of the primacy of United States interests in the guise of applying
an international jurisdictional rule of reason." 30 While it purports to be
balanced and fair, the Vitamins court sends quite a different message to the
outside world: In a world with no supreme sovereign, we will take
sovereignty by judicial fiat and assert it fully whenever pragmatic concerns
motivate us and our power over a defendant with property or interests in the
United States allows us. The court's balancing insinuates that sovereignty
matters only insofar as it is American sovereignty.
Such a message has far-reaching international consequences. First, it
invites antagonism and defensive reactions by the countries most likely to
be affected by the ruling: the closest U.S. trading partners. These reactions
might take the form of foreign countries' liberally extending their laws and
procedures to U.S. parties who have only tenuous links to their jurisdiction.
More generally, the antagonism incited by the extraterritorial application of
U.S. discovery rules might result in unwillingness by foreign countries to
compromise their values in other areas and hurt wider U.S. interests in the
international arena. It might also jeopardize valuable efforts-often
spearheaded by the United States-to reach international agreements on
jurisdiction and procedure.
The unilateral extension of U.S. laws across borders might also tarnish
the image of the U.S. judiciary and lead to the increased use of international
arbitration to settle disputes-a process that, like the Hague Convention,
usually relies on a mix of civil-law and common-law procedures for
gathering evidence, but that, unlike the Convention, is subject to very little
supervision by national courts.3
All of these considerations weigh in favor of applying the rules of the
Hague Convention on a first-resort basis when jurisdiction is contested. An
even better way to ensure the uniform application of this standard would be
to revive efforts to codify the Aerospatiale minority opinion, calling for
first resort to the Hague Convention, at least in cases of jurisdictional
discovery. 32 District courts have proven unable to apply the balancing test
30. Maier, supra note 27, at 590.
31. It is notable that, in recognition of U.S. commitments under the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the Supreme Court
has declared antitrust matters to be arbitrable, despite the significant public policy issues at stake.
E.g., Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
32. The amendment proposed by the Advisory Committee in 1989 would have codified the
minority opinion in Agrospatialeby adding to Rule 26(a) the following language:
If an applicable treaty or convention provides for discovery in another country, the
discovery methods agreed to in such treaty or convention shall be employed; but if
discovery conducted by such methods is inadequate or inequitable and additional
discovery is not prohibited by the treaty or convention, a party may employ the
methods here provided in addition to those provided by such convention or treaty.
Gary B. Born & Andrew N. Vollmer, The Effect of the Revised FederalRules of Civil Procedure
on Personal Jurisdiction,Service, and Discovery in InternationalCases, 150 F.R.D. 221, 242
(1993). For a good account of the amendment's history, see id.
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consistently and clearly, and the limited opportunity to appeal rulings on
discovery has exacerbated this tendency. Codification would be very useful
in ensuring a more predictable and coherent application of the Convention.
The use of the Hague Convention rules might result in a somewhat less
rapid resolution of jurisdictional disputes, but to quote Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Arospatiale, "unless the costs become prohibitive, saving time
and money is not such a high priority in discovery that some additional
burden cannot be tolerated in the interest of international goodwill." 3 3 The
strong negative reactions by foreign states to U.S. court orders for
discovery on their territory have clearly indicated that international
goodwill might be endangered by an aggressive approach to the regulation
of extraterritorial discovery. 34 When jurisdiction is contested, forum-centric
regulation of discovery abroad becomes all the more unpalatable, as it
conflicts with "traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice" 35 and
with international norms of reasonableness in the exercise of jurisdiction. It
is therefore imperative that higher courts or legislators temper the
assertiveness of district courts in the regulation of international
jurisdictional discovery before the district courts' scattered decisions
coalesce into a body of precedent carrying its own force.
-Jenia Iontcheva

33. Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 562 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Arospatale, 482 U.S. at 526 n.6 (citing a French statute that criminalizes
cooperation with foreign orders for jurisdictional discovery unless they are done in accordance
with international agreements or French law); Brief for. the Federal Republic of Germany as
Amicus Curiae, Airospatiale, 482 U.S. 522 (No. 85-1695); Brief for the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae, A'rospatiale, 482 U.S.
522; Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae, Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. 522; see also
Born & Vollmer, supra note 32, at 243-44 (noting foreign governments' protests against attempts

to codify procedures for extraterritorial discovery that are even more aggressive than
Airospatiale).
35. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

